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Executive Summary
The recent surge in U.S. patenting and the expansion of patentable subject mat-
ter has increased patent office backlogs and raised concerns that, in some cases,
patents of insufficient quality or with inadequate search of prior art are being
issued. At the same time, patent litigation and its costs are rising. This paper
explores the potential of a postgrant review process modeled on the European
opposition system to improve patent quality, reveal overlooked prior art, and
reduce subsequent litigation. We argue that the welfare gains to such a system
may be substantial.
This is an agency in crisis, and it's going to get worsewe don't change our dynamic.
It doesn't do me any good to pretend there's not a problem when there is.
James E. Rogan, appointed director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
in December 2001, as quoted in the Los Angeles Times, February 7, 2003.
I.Introduction
Beginning in the 1980s, a series of administrative, judicial, and legisla-
tive actions strengthened the economic value of U.S. patents and ex-
tended their coverage in areas such as computer software and business
methods. Partly as a result of these changes, patent applications in the
United States continue to grow (see figure 4.1), and the resources avail-
able to the patent office have not kept pace. The fraction of patents
granted within two years of application has fallen from 85 percent in
the early 1990s to about 70 percent in the late 1990s. At the April 2002
hearings before the House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and
Intellectual Property, Commissioner Rogan stated, "Average pendency
surpassed 24 months in 1999, and we expect it to average 26.5 months
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Figure 4.1
USPTO utility patents 1965-2002.
A second consequence of these changes has been an increase in pat-
ent litigation and a more recent increase in patent litigation rates. In a
study of patent litigation between 1978 and 1995, Lanjouw and Schank-
erman (2002) found that the rate of litigation rose only slightly between
the 1978-1984 and 1991-1995 periods, from nineteen to twenty-one
suits per thousand patents, with some variation across technology ar-
eas. Somaya (2002) suggests that this rate rose again in the late 1990s.
In a new and comprehensive study of patent litigation focusing on
cases that terminated in 1998-2000, Allison et al. (2003) report a litiga-
tion rate of approximately thirty-two suits per thousand patents.
Whether or not litigation per patent issued has increased substantially,
the fact remains that the absolute amount of litigation has grown enor-
mously, increasing both the private and public costs of the system as
a whole.
Although many of the administrative, legal, and judicial changes in
policy affecting patent validity, examination, and value were under-
taken at the behest of the U.S. business community, concerns have been
raised about the potential economic burdens of low-quality patents in
an environment of greater deference to the rights of the patent holder
(Merges 1999, Barton 2000, Kingston 2001). It is therefore not surprising
that a number of experts have suggested that the U.S. patent examina-
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of patent and nonpatent prior art, resulting in the issuing of patents
of considerable breadth and insufficient quality, and that this problem
has worsened in recent years. Many of these critics advocate the reform
or extension of procedures that would enable interested parties other
than U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) examiners to bring
relevant information to bear on this process either before or shortly
after the issue of a patent.
The present paper reviews the prospects for improving the operation
of the patent system and lowering its cost by changing the admirtistra-
five process at the USPTO. At present, the primary administrative
procedure for a challenge to the validity of a U.S. patent is the re-
examination proceeding, which may be initiated by any party during
the life of the patent. A more elaborate and adversarial procedure for
challenging the validity of patents in the immediate aftermath of their
issue is the opposition proceeding used by the European Patent Office
(EPO). Several scholars, both legal and economic, have advocated the
introduction of such a system in the United States or a strengthening
of the re-examination system to improve the quality of patents and to
increase the likelthood that relevant prior art is brought to bear, espe-
cially in new subject matter areas. (See Hall 2003 for a summary of
these views.) In this paper, we consider the likely effects of introducing
such a postgrant review process in the U.S. patent system, focusing in
particular on the ability of such a process to improve the quality of
patents and reduce the length of time that the current reliance on litiga-
tion requires to ascertain the validity of the relatively valuable patents
contested in court. Our assessment of the benefits and costs of a U.S.
postgrant patent review system draws on our previous work (Graham
et al. 2003), as well as that of Janis (1997) on alternatives to the re-
examination procedures and Levin and Levin (2002) for models of stra-
tegic litigation and opposition behavior.
We begin by reviewing the current causes of concern about the oper-
ation of the U.S. patent system, focusing on the patent quality issues
that such a system might be designed to improve. We then describe
the institutional background and administrative structure of the U.S.
and European patent systems. Readers who are already familiar with
the patent system or who are not interested in the institutional detail
may wish to skip this section. The final sections of the paper compare
the operation of the two patent systems and then present a simple wel-
fare analysis of the expected costs and benefits of introducing a more
adversarial administrative challenge system.118 Hall, Graham, Harhoff, and Mowery
II.The Problem
Patent Quality'
What do we mean by "patent quality"? From the perspective of eco-
nomic welfare, granting the property right described by a patent in-
volves trading off the gain from providing an incentive for innovation
against the deadweight loss implied by the possibility of a monopoly
during the patent term. The statutory definition of a patentable inven-
tion is that it be novel and nonobvious, and that it have utility.1 Both the
economic and legal views suggest that high-quality patents describe an
invention that is truly new, rather than an invention that is already in
widespread use but not yet patented.2 See table 4.1 for some examples
of patents that appear to violate this definition, mostly because there
is prior art that is not easily searchable in written form.
Besides the three statutory requirements, a fourth criterion for grant-
ing a patent on an invention is that the patent application must disclose
sufficient details about the invention. Patents thus serve another social
purpose: these disclosures in the published patent can facilitate knowl-
edge spillovers to others who might use or improve the invention. An-
other criterion for a high-quality patent therefore is that it enable those
skilled in the art to comprehend the invention well enough to use the
patent document for implementation of the described invention. This
dimension of patent quality, however, is less likely to be affected by
postgrant opposition proceedings.
From a social welfare perspective, an important characteristic of a
high-quality patent is that there be relatively little uncertainty over the
breadth of its claims, i.e., over what specific features of a technical ad-
vance are claimed under the terms of the patent, as well as whether
these claims are likely to be upheld in legal proceedings following the
issue of the patent. Uncertainty about the validity of a patent has sev-
eral potential costs: such uncertainty may cause the patent holder to
underinvest in the technology, it could reduce investment by potential
competitors in competing technical advances, and it may lead to costly
litigation after both the holder and potential competitors have invested
sizable amounts of money.
Consequences of Low Patent Qualit1i
Although some scholars, notably Lemley (2001), have argued that the































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2120 Hall, Graham, Harhoff, and Mowery
experience suggests that there are some unintended consequences, in
the form of complicating property rights and feedback effects. In this
section, we review the arguments for increasing patent quality.
Low-quality patents can create considerable uncertainty among in-
ventors or would-be commercializers of inventions and slow either the
pace of innovation or investment in the commercialization of new tech-
nologies. Lerner (1995) has shown that fear of litigation may cause
smaller entrant firms to avoid areas where incumbents hold large num-
bers of patents. Such entry avoidance may be rational and even welfare
enhancing if the incumbents' patents are known for certain to be valid,
but low-quality patents held by incumbents may also deter entry into
a technological area if the costs of invalidating the patents are too high.
In these circumstances, technological alternatives may not be commer-
cialized, and consumer welfare suffers.
The lack of relatively rapid processes for resolving patent validity
and ensuring higher patent quality may also slow the pace of invention
in fields characterized by "cumulative invention," i.e., those in which
one inventor's efforts rely on previous technical advances or advances
in complementary technologies. But if these previous technical ad-
vances are covered by patents of dubious validity or excessive breadth,
the costs to inventors of pursuing the inventions that rely on them may
be so high that they discourage such cumulative invention. On the
other hand, large numbers of low-quality patents may dramatically
increase the level of fragmentation of property rights covering prior-
generation or complementary technologies, thus raising the transaction
costs for inventors obtaining access (e.g., through licenses) to these
technologies. Finally, the issue of a large number of low-quality patents
will increase uncertainty among inventors concerning the level of pro-
tection enjoyed by these related inventions, which in turn will make
it more costly and difficult for inventors to build on these related inven-
tions in their own technical advances.
The issuance of low-quality patents is also likely to spur significant
increases in patent applications, further straining the already overbur-
dened examination processes of the USPTO. A kind of vicious circle
may result, in which cursory examinations of patent applications result
in the issue of low-quality patents, which triggers rapid growth in ap-
plications, further taxing the limited resources of the USPTO, and thus
further limiting the examination of individual applications, and further
degrading the quality of patents.
Recent decisions by the court of appeals for the federal circuit
(CAFC), the specialized appeals court for patent cases, concerning theImproving U.S. Patent Quality 121
validity of important patents (those deemed sufficiently valuable by
the patent holder or a competitor to litigate and appeal) create still
another reason for serious consideration of a nonjudicial process for
postissue validity challenges. For example, the CAFC ruled in 2002 that
the USPTO had incorrectly rejected two applications for "obvious-
ness," arguing that if an examiner rejects an application using "general
knowledge," that knowledge "must be articulated and placed on the
record."3 According to deputy commissioner Esther Kepplinger, "[W]e
can't reject something just because it's stupid."4 This decision could
significantly weaken the level of scrutiny provided by the already
costly and overcrowded patent-litigation system. A system that enables
third parties (including competitors) to bring such knowledge (in the
form of written prior art) to bear on the patent could help in making
an obviousness determination.
The U.S. patent system, no less than those of other advanced indus-
trial economies, is very much a political creation. Its development and
frequent alterations at the hands of the U.S. Congress reflect changes in
the balance of political power among corporate inventors, independent
inventors, the broader research community, and the general public. It
is hardly an accident, after all, that the most recent series of changes
in the U.S. and international patent systems were undertaken by U.S.
political actors during the throes of the competitiveness crisis of the
1980s. And the increased economic stakes in intellectual property re-
sulting from these policy changes, as well as the broader shift to a
knowledge-based economy, are likely to complicate reforms of such
potentially far-reaching scope as the introduction of a more elaborate
system for postgrant validity challenges. Indeed, the re-examination
process that we discuss below was considerably weakened during de-
bate over its passage by the U.S. Congress. Nevertheless, consideration
of any such reforms must begin with an analysis of their operation in
other industrial-economy patent systems. The remainder of this paper
examines the EPO opposition system and compares its operation and
outcomes with those of the existing administrative process for patent-
validity challenges in the United States: the "re-examination."
III.Institutional Background
The U.S. and European patent systems have similar aims and require-
ments for patentability, but they differ in the allowable subject matter
and in their administrative procedures. As we noted earlier, the U.S.
system requires that an invention (process, machine, manufacture, or122 Hall, Graham, Harhoff, and Mowery
composition of matter) satisfy four requirements to be patentable:
adequate disclosure, novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness. In
Europe, firms and individuals have been able since 1978 to submit a
single application to the European Patent Office that specifies up to
twenty-four national jurisdictions in which they desire patent protec-
tion for an invention. Under the EPO regime, the patentability re-
quirementsadequate disclosure, novelty, industrial application, and
inventive stepare broadly similar but not identical to those of the
United States.
The median time between application and patent issue in the U.S.
system during the 1980s and 1990s was eighteen months to two years
(with a long list of patent applications with a much longer wait time),
and in the EPO, it was slightly more than four years. As part of the
patent system harmonization legislated in the American Inventors Pro-
tection Act of 1999, the United States instituted a policy of publication
eighteen months after application in November 2000 for many patents
with applications pending in jurisdictions outside the United States.
In contrast, EPO applications have always been published with an
eighteen-month lag time, regardless of whether the patents have been
issued.
Both systems have a postgrant procedure through which the validity
of the patent can be challenged by other parties, but the two patent
systems' postgrant challenge procedures differ significantly. In both
systems, interested parties can also bring suit in court over infringe-
ment and validity (with some restrictions on when a suit can be filed).
We discuss these administrative processes for postgrant challenges in
the following sections.
USPTO Examination and Re-examination Procedures
In the United States, inventors may claim a utility patent by making
application to the USPTO. Before a patent is issued, the USPTO is
charged with ensuring that the invention is adequately specified; cov-
ers patentable subject matter; and is useful, novel, and nonobvious.
Procedurally, the application must be filed within one year of the
invention's public use or publication, contain an adequate descrip-
tion with one or more claims, and be accompanied by the payment of
a fee.
The USPTO patent examiner is the arbiter of the patentability, nov-
elty, usefulness, and nonobviousness requirements cited above, judg-Improving U.S. Patent Quality 123
ing these standards against the "prior art," i.e., prior inventions, in the
field. Prosecution of the patent has been characterized as a give-and-
take affair, with negotiation and renegotiation between the patentee
and the examiner that ordinarily continues for two to three years
(Merges et al. 1997). The costs of prosecuting a patent through the
USPTO range from $5,000 to $100,000 (including the USPTO issue fee),
depending on the nature of the technology.
Re-examination, originally envisioned as an alternative to expensive
and time-consuming litigation, was created by the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act.
The legislative history of this act suggests that the re-examination was
intended to be a mechanism that would be less expensive and less time
consuming than litigation.5 During the legislative process, however,
the act was purged of its intended adversarial characteristics, reducing
the usefulness of the procedure for opponents of a given patent.
Procedurally, the re-examination proceeding permits the patent
owner or any other party to notify the USPTO and request that the
grounds on which the patent was originally issued be reconsidered by
an examiner. Initiation of a re-examination requires that some previ-
ously undisclosed new and relevant'piece of prior art be presented to
the agency. Under the statute, a relevant disclosure must be printed in
either a prior patent or prior publicationno other source can serve
as grounds for the re-examination.
After initiation by notification and the payment of a fee to the
USPTO, the re-examination goes forward only if the USPTO finds a
substantial new question of patentability. Such a determination was
intended by law makers to prevent the reopening of issues deemed
settled in the original examination (Merges 1997). The USPTO must
make this determination within three months of the request and, hav-
ing made the determination, must notify the patent owner.
When the owner is not the re-examination proponent (about half the
cases), the patentee is allowed to file a response to the newly discovered
prior art within two months. If the owner chooses to respond, the re-
quester is afforded an opportunity to reply within two months. By
choosing not to respond, the owner can limit the requester's partici-
pation in the process. The re-examination is an ex parte proceeding
between the patent owner and the USPTO that provides limited oppor-
tunities for third-party involvement.6
The party requesting a re-examination is entitled to notify the
USPTO of the triggering prior art, to receive a copy of the patentee's reply
to the re-examination (if any), and to file a response to that reply. The124 Hall, Graham, Harhoff, and Mowery
owner's role in the process is much more involved: the re-examination
statute contemplates a second examination, with the same type of give-
and-take negotiation between owner and patent office that occurred
during the initial issuance of the patent. The examiner remains the final
arbiter of the process, and it is not uncommon for the original examiner
to be assigned the follow-up re-examination, thus putting the question of
whether prior art was overlooked in the hands of the same government
official who was responsible for ensuring that no prior art was overlooked
in the previous search.
Once the re-examination goes forward, however, the statute requires
that the commissioner make a validity determination. The original pat-
ent is afforded no statutory presumption of validity in the proceeding,
although the practice of assigning re-examinations to the original ex-
aminer may produce such a presumption. The re-examination cannot
be abandoned or postponed to await the result of concurrent litigation
proceedings, although it may be stayed during other USPTO proceed-
ings, including re-issue or interferences. A re-examination may result
in the cancellation of all or some of the claims in a patent or the confir-
mation of all or some of the claims Nothing in the re-examination pro-
cedure can expand the scope of the original patent's claims, but claims
may be amended or new claims added during the renegotiation be-
tween the patent owner and the examiner.
In summary, for parties seeking to invalidate an issued patent, the
re-examination procedure involves considerable costs and risks. The
filing fee for the re-examination is substantial, and practitioners
estimate the average costs of a re-examination at $10,000 to $100,000,
depending on the complexity of the matter. Although the costs of a re-
examination are lower than those of litigation ($1 to $3 million), the
third-party challenger in re-examination is denied a meaningful role
in the process, and the patent holder maintains communications with
the examining officer, offering amendments or adding new claims dur-
ing the re-examination. Re-examination may make it more difficult
for challengers to prevail in patent-validity litigation because juries
tend to give added weight to re-examined patents. The court of appeals
for the federal circuit has indicated that claims confirmed by the re-
examining officer present added barriers to a successful contest.7 As a
result, challengers face powerful incentives to forego re-examination
in favor of litigation, a process that may well be more expensive, more
time consuming, and less expert in testing postissue validity.Improving U.S. Patent Quality 125
Patent Litigation in the United States
In the United States, postissue validity can also be tested in court. Pro-
cedurally, litigation differs markedly from the re-examination proce-
dure. Unlike the re-examination procedure, litigation is an adversarial
proceeding in which the litigant may elect to have the case heard by
either a judge or a jury. Because patent suits generally arise from a
charge from the patent owner of infringement, the patent owner exerts
considerable control over the timing of enforcement and litigation in
a patent dispute.8
Legal standards create a relatively hostile environment in the federal
courts for challengers seeking to invalidate an issued patent. Under
the statute, patents are "born valid," thus enjoying a presumption of
validity during the court proceedings. Furthermore, the evidentiary
standard for proving that a claim is invalid is clear and convincing
evidence, a standard considerably higher than the mere preponderance
of proof required in the typical civil suit. Because judges and juries may
have limited technical expertise, these presumptions and evidentiary
barriers create high costs for challengers. The "propatent" judicial phi-
losophy promulgated by the CAFC since its creation has compounded
these barriers. According to one study, successful challenges to patent
validity fell from 50 percent to 33 percent in the years after the creation
of the CAFC (Lemley and Allison 1998).
Direct costs in litigation are also high compared with those of re-
examination. Estimates of legal costs in patent litigation run from
$500,000 to $3 million per suit, depending on the amount at risk
(AIPLA 2001) or to $500,000 per claim at issue, per side (Barton 2000).
One important driver of these costs is the extensive use of pretrial dis-
covery. The lag between filing a patent suit and reaching a resolution
can also be considerable. One study estimates the average length of a
district court patent suit at thirty-one months (Magrab 1993).
But, in fact, very few patent suits actually go to trial, as reported
in Lanjouw and Schankerman (2002), who find that approximately 95
percent of all patent suits settle either before or during trial: 78 percent
settle even before the pretrial hearing, an additional 16 percent settle
before trial, and 1 percent settle during trial. The median length of time
to settlement is eight months, sixteen months, and twenty-five months,
respectively, implying that the average or median time to a litigation
outcome is somewhat less than the thirty-one months reported by126 HaIl, Graham, Harhoff, and Mowery
Magrab. This does not mean that litigation is inexpensive. According to
the surveys conducted by the AIPLA, about half of the estimated legal
costs of litigation are incurred before the end of the discovery phase
(AIPLA 2001). It also does not mean that the social costs of a patent are
avoided because settlement before trial is likely to lead to a collusive
outcome.
EPO Examination and Opposition Procedures
Patent protection for European signatories to the European Patent Con-
vention (EPC) can be obtained by filing several national applications at
the respective national patent offices or by filing one EPO patent applica-
tion at the European Patent Office. The EPO application designates the
EPC member states for which patent protection is requested.9 The total
cost of a European patent amounts to approximately 29,800, roughly
three times as much as a typical national application.10 Thus, if patent
protection is sought for more than three designated states, the appli-
cation for a European patent is less expensive than independent ap-
plications in several jurisdictions. This cost advantage has made the
European filing path particularly attractive for applicants selling goods
and services in multiple European markets. Increases in the number of
patent applications and grants have given the EPO a level of economic
importance that now resembles that of the USPTO.
EPO patent grants are issued for inventions that are novel, mark an
inventive step, are commercially applicable, and are not excluded from
patentability for other reasons. After the filing of an EPO application,
The Hague EPO office produces a search report for the applicant. The
search report describes the state of prior art regarded as relevant ac-
cording to EPO guidelines for the patentability of the invention, i.e., it
contains a list of references to prior patents and / or nonpatent sources.
Unlike the procedure in the U.S. system, applicants at the EPO are not
required to supply a full list of prior art (see Michel and Bettels 2001,
p. 191ff). Within six months after the announcement of the publication
of the search report in the EP bulletin, applicants can request the ex-
arnination of their application. This request is a compulsory pre-
requisite for the patent grant. If examination is not requested, the
patent application is deemed to be withdrawn. Eighteen months after
the priority date, the patent application is published. At this point,
the application is normally under examination; thus, the patent owner
is generally required to reveal some information about his or her in-Improving U.S. Patent Quality 127
vention before the grant of the patent and even if no patent is ever
issued.
After examination (if requested) has been performed, the EPO either
informs the applicant that the patent wifi be granted as specified in the
original application or requires the applicant to agree to changes in the
application that are necessary for the patent grant. In the latter case, a
negotiation process similar to that in the U.S. system follows. Once the
applicant and the EPO have agreed on the scope of the allowable subject
matter, the patent is issued for the designated states and is translated
into the relevant national languages. If the EPO declines to grant a pat-
ent, the applicant may file an appeal. Within nine months after the patent
has been granted, any third party can oppose the European patent cen-
trally at the EPO by filing an opposition against the granting decision.
The outcome of the opposition procedure is binding for all designated
states. If opposition is not filed within nine months after the grant, the
patent's validity can be challenged only under the legal rules of the re-
spective designated countries. The EPO opposition procedure is thus the
only centralized challenge process for European patents.
An EPO patent opponent must file an opposition with the EPO and
present evidence that the prerequisites for patentability were not ful-
filled; i.e., the opponent must show that the invention lacked novelty
and / or an inventive step or that the disclosure was poor or insufficient.
At the EPO, an opposition division determines the outcome. The exam-
iner who granted the patent is a member of the three-person opposition
chamber but may not be the chairperson. The opposition procedure
can have one of three outcomes: the patent may be upheld without
amendments, it may be .amended, or it may be revoked. Data on oppo-
sition outcomes reported in Graham et al. (2003) indicate that revoca-
tion occurs in about one-third of all opposition cases.
Another interesting aspect of the opposition procedure concerns the
restrictions imposed by this process on the opponent's ability to settle
out of court. Once an opposition is filed, the EPO can choose to pursue
the case on its own, even if the opposition is withdrawn. Thus, the
opponent and patent holder may not be free to settle their case outside
the EPO opposition process once the opposition is filed. This provision
of the opposition proceeding may discourage its use by opponents
seeking to force patent holders to license their patents.
Both the patent holder(s) and the opponent(s) may appeal the out-
come of the opposition procedure. The appeal must be filed within two
months after receipt of the decision of the opposition division, and it128 Hall, Graham, Harhoff, and Mowery
must be substantiated within an additional two months. The board of
appeal affords the final opportunity at the EPO to test the validity of
the contested European patent. Both parties can bring expert witnesses
to the proceedings, and various options are available for extending
deadlines. Graham et al. (2003) report that the median duration of the
challenge procedures (opposition and any appeal) is about three years,
although there is considerable variation in the duration of individual
cases (the interquartile range is also about three years).
The official fee for filing an opposition is 613; for filing an appeal
against the outcome of opposition, the fee is 1,022. However, the total
costs to an opponent or the patent holder are much higher. Estimates
by patent attorneys of the costs of an opposition range between 15,000
and 25,000 for each party. Patent attorneys we interviewed agreed
that opponents have limited ability to drive up the patent holders' costs
by filing an opposition (in contrast to litigation in the United States),
because attorney fees are regulated in most European countries, includ-
ing Germany, where many patent lawyers who have the required EPO
registration reside.
Patent Litigation in Europe
One desirable feature of the FF0 opposition system is its centralized
structure within the fragmented European legal system for patent chal-
lenges. As we noted earlier, patent litigation affecting EPO patents is
conducted at the national level. The centralized nature of the EPO op-
position process thus arguably is more important in this context than
in the United States, where the federal courts operate as a more unified
system. Nonetheless, a full evaluation of the effects of the EPO opposi-
tion system requires some consideration of the possibilities for litiga-
tion, which are not precluded by the opposition proceeding.
There have been few systematic studies of patent litigation within
the various European nations, and we therefore confine ourselves to a
brief review of the few known facts. Outcomes in the local litigation
processes involving EPO patents are restricted to the "local" level; for
example, the patent may be invalidated in Spain, but this finding does
not affect its validity in Italy. During the past decade, national patent
courts have increasingly taken evidence and decisions from litigation
in other European nations into account, but no systematic study has
analyzed such legal spillover effects (Stauder 1996, Stauder et al. 1999).Improving U.S. Patent Quality 129
Table 4.2
Estimated patent costs in the United States and Europe'
'Numbers are in 2002 dollars using an exchange rate of 0.93 euros tothe dollar. Figures
are approximate.
bmese fees are for an entity that is not small.
The differences among national jurisdictions within Europe are enor-
mous, requiring substantial investmentsin each national suit and driv-
ing up the costs of challenging the national patentsemerging from an
EPO grant in several of the designated states. The costsof litigation
in any national court have been estimated to bebetween 50,000 and
500,000, depending on the complexity of the case. This coststructure
makes an attack at the European level with the oppositionprocedure
particularly attractive for a current or potential competitorof the patent
holder. The litigation rate (computed as the numberof cases for which
a suit is filed divided bythe number of patents) in most European
countries is roughly 1 percent, slightly lowerthan the 1.9 percent re-
ported for the United States (Stauder 1996, 1989; Lanjouwand Schank-
erman 2001). However, recent estimatesby Cremers (2003) suggest that
the litigation rate may be as high in Germany as inthe United States,
on the order of 2.1percent.1' At this juncture, all that can be said is
that the quantitative evidence is too sparse toconclude from these fig-
ures that the existence ofthe opposition mechanism leads to a reduc-
tion in litigation or in litigation cost. Table 4.2summarizes the costs
associated with each system.
IV.Comparing the Two Systems
In Graham et al. (2003), we compared theoperation of the postissue
re-examination and opposition systems for challenging patentvalidity




Legal costs $30,000 $5,914
Translation NA $12,366
Renewal (10 years) $6,000 $9,140
Re-examination/opposition
Fees $2,520 $1,075
Legal costs $10,000$100,000 $21,505
Litigation $0.5M$3M $54K$540K130 Hall, Graham, Harhoff, and Mowery
between an ex parte system like the current U.S. system and the inter
partes system used in Europe. First, the U.S. re-examination procedure
differs dramatically from the EPO opposition procedure in almostall
its features. The two most important are that re-examinationsare much
less common, with an overall average rate of 0.2 percent, incontrast
to the European opposition rate of about 8 percent, and that the identity
of the party requesting a re-examination in the U.S.system is the
patent owner in at least 44 percent of the cases, lowering the ef-
fective rate even more. This characteristic of re-examinationhardly
qualifies it as the sort of adversarial procedure that EPOoppositions
represent.
We also found that EPO oppositions resolved validity challenges
more slowly than USPTO re-examination proceedings. Indeed, opposi-
tion proceedings in some cases (and almost certainly in important,
complex cases with numerous opponents, appeals, etc.)may well take
as much time to be resolved as with litigation in the U.S. system. None-
theless, the higher frequency of EPO opposition comparedto U.S. re-
examination or litigation is at least consistent with the hypothesis that
the opposition process handles many more legal disputesover patent
validity than are addressed by the U.S. re-examinationprocess and at
a lower cost than the U.S. litigation process.'2
Our analysis of the outcomes of the re-examination and opposition
system outcomes confirmed that the adversarial nature of the opposi-
tion system was more likely to lead to outcomes unfavorableto the
patent holder. In table 4.3, we show the distribution of outcomes for
all re-examinations and all oppositions of patentsover the past twenty
years. It is clear from the table that patent revocation is much more
likely when a patent is opposed in Europe (one in three is revoked)
than when a patent is re-examined in the United States (onlyone in
ten is revoked). Combined with the lower probability of re-examina-
tion, the overall probability that a patent is revoked viaa postgrant
administrative challenge is 3 percent in Europe and essentiallyzero
(0.02 percent) in the United States. Conversely, re-examination ismore
likely than opposition to lead to amendment of the patent, whetheror
not the patent owner initiated the process.
Our analysis also indicated that patent amendment, rather thanrevo-
cation, is more likely for oppositions in relativelynew fields of inven-
tive activity, for more complex patents,or for oppositions in which
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8132 Hall, Graham, Harhoff, and Mowery
extent to which oppositions are followed by litigation in the European
patent system, we were unable to determine whether the lack of any
speed advantage for oppositions in resolving patent disputes quickly
is offset by a reduction of litigation rates associated with oppositions.
The EPO system may offer few advantages over the U.S. system for
postissue patent challenges, but we cannot address this issue without
analyzing litigation data for both the U.S. and European systems. Any
truly comprehensive assessment of the social costs and benefits of the
two challenge systems requires that we consider both patent office pro-
cesses of postgrant challenge (opposition or re-examination) and legal
system litigation. Nevertheless, we present a simple version of such an
analysis in the next section of the paper.
Although an EPO opposition must be filed within nine months of
patent issue, it does not reach a conclusion more rapidly than the U.S.
re-examination procedure if we estimate the total time lag as the length
of time from patent application date to final resolution. The average
lag time between application date and the initiation of a challenge is
substantially greater within the U.S. re-examination system than in the
EPO opposition system, but this difference reflects the diffefent time
limits on the initiation of such proceedings. Should we conclude from
these comparative data that the longer lag times in the EPO opposition
system imply a lengthier period of uncertainty and legal expense, and
therefore a higher welfare burden within the innovation systems of
these economies? Such a conclusion is unfounded because it relies on
a characterization of the re-examination and opposition proceedings
as analogous in their characteristics, rigor, and outcomes. The data pre-
sented above on the identity of the parties initiating re-examinations,
as well as the abundant evidence discussed earlier of significant proce-
dural differences between the re-examination and opposition pro-
cesses, should invalidate any such analogies. Any such comparison
of challenges must incorporate data on the next stages of these
challenges, which in both Europe and the United States involve
litigation.
One of the concerns often raised about both litigation and postgrant
administrative challenges is that they may be used by firms with
deep pockets to harass smaller firms and independent inventors.'3 Al-
though re-examination requests are slightly more likely if the patent
is held by an independent inventor, there is little if any evidence that
independent-inventor patents are significantly more prone to EPO op-
positions than other patents, which means that the opposition systemImproving U.S. Patent Quality 133
in Europe is not being used by large players to harass small inventors.
Nevertheless, the possibility of some strategic use of the system by
competing firms cannot be ruled out. For example, Harhoff and Hall
(2002) find in the hair care industry that German firms systematically
oppose the patents of their multinational competitorsand are not op-
posed in turn. Whether this finding is due to greater expertise and
knowledge of the prior art or to greater familiarity with the use of the
opposition system as a weapon is not clear.
V.Welfare Gains from Improved Postgrant Review
Would introducing an adversarial challenge system simply add an-
other level of costly litigation to what already exists? Or does it have
the potential to reduce the subsequent litigation? Answering these
questions is a complex task, given the difficulty of predicting the
responses of firms and individuals to a ratherradical change in the
administration of the patent system. Nevertheless, it is possible to per-
form some simple welfare computations based on plausible assump-
tions about the value of patent validity and the known costs of both
the European and U.S. patent systems. As Levin and Levin (2002) argue
in their discussion of the same issue, successful patent opposition is
likely to reduce subsequent patent litigation substantially, thus increas-
ing social welfare, but opposition itself brings forward cases that would
not have gone to litigation and affects the terms on which firms areable
to license the technology embedded in patents. Theyconclude that,
on balance, substantial welfare gains are likelyfrom the introduction
of an opposition system. In this section of the paper, we present our
own analysis of the consequences of thischange and reach a similar
conclusion.
Successful opposition should reduce litigation because invalid pat-
ents could not then be litigated, although this might require a some-
what circumscribed appeals process that does not allow recourse to
the courts. Unsuccessful opposition may still lead to litigation later
and, unless barred by statute, successful opposition might also lead to
later litigation on the part of the former patent holder. The net result
of this scenario is fewer suits filed, and possibly fewer collusive settle-
ments based on the threat of a suit, although there might be an increase
in collusive settlements based on the threat of opposition.
The computation shown below makes these ideas more precise.
We compute the social benefits and costs of introducing an opposition134 Hall, Graham, Harhoff, and Mowery
system under a few simple stylized assumptions. Although the precise
numbers should be viewed somewhat sceptically, the order of magni-
tudes are such that substantial social gains may accrue from sucha
system. The total cost of the system per year is assumed to be given
by
C = c,4)N
where c, is the cost of an opposition,4)is the rate of opposition, and
N is the total number of patents issued in a year. We assumea range
of costs between $100,000 per opposition (the European estimate) and
$500,000 (the cost assumed by Levin and Levin [2002]), and a range of
opposition rates between 2 percent (very conservative) and 10 percent,
which is approximately the rate in Europe.
Computing the benefit of the system requires some assumptions
about the effects of opposition outcomes on the costs associated with
avoiding litigation, collusive presuit settlements, and the exercise of
monopoly power. We write the benefit as
B = b04)N
where b, is the cost avoided by each opposition,4)is the rate of opposi-
tion, and N is the total number of patents issued in a year. The variable
Ii, has three components, corresponding to the three possible outcomes
of the opposition: and N revocation, amendment, or rejection. To esti-
mate these components, we assume that the opposition and appeals
boards make the correct decision when they revoke or amenda patent
or when they reject an Opposition.
In the case of revocation, we can assume that the patent should never
have been granted and that its existence may create excessive market
power. Suppose that in litigation, the same correct outcome would be
obtained; i.e., the patent right would be destroyed. As long as there-
spective case would have ended up in litigation, the opposition will
simply pre-empt later litigation. The welfare effect is then to reduce
the number of cases in litigation, at the cost of an opposition proceed-
ing. We assign an average social value of $2 million to avoided litiga-
tion, based on the estimates provided by AIPLA (2001) for legal costs
plus an addition for the direct costs to the firms involved and the cost
of court services.
The parties may have an incentive to settle; thus, not all cases will
actually be litigated (Lanjouw and Schankerman 2002). But in this case,
if the correct outcome would have been a revocation, a settlement be-Improving U.S. Patent Quality 135
tween the parties will be socially inefficient because it typically main-
tains the patent for the proprietor and allows the other party in
litigation to have an exclusive license. This situation amounts to a case
in which the two parties collusively maintain patent protection, which
may impose considerable welfare costs on society.14 The welfare costs
of such an agreement depend on the value of the patent right and de-
mand conditions. As our base case, we assume that high-value patents
that are attacked in the opposition procedure have an average value
of $4 million and therefore a monopoly welfare loss of $2 million.'5 For
example, Harhoff, Scherer, and Vopel (2003) compute an average value
of about (1977) DM 400,000 for patents of German proprietors. They
also estimate regressions indicating that opposed patents that survived
opposition are worth about ten times this amount. We assume that
patents that were opposed but did not survive opposition would gen-
erate the same level of profits as patents that withstood opposition.
In 2003 terms (assuming a 4 percent growth rate), the average value
of an attacked patent would then be roughiy 5.76 million euros
[= (1.0427400,000)/21. A conservative estimate of the value of the
attacked patent is therefore $4 million on average, with welfare losses
in the monopoly case of $2 million.
In the case of amendment (where claims are usually narrowed), a simi-
lar argument holds, although the avoided litigation cost is likely to
be much smaller. The results from opposition rejection are more ambigu-
ous. It may reduce uncertainty about the patent validity and therefore
reduce subsequent litigation, but this is by no means certain. In our base
case, we assume no effect, and we also evaluate a variant where there is
increased social cost due to an increase in litigation probability when
opposition is rejected.
In table 4.4, we show the cost-benefit computation under different
scenarios. Three panels are shown in the table, each corresponding to
a set of assumptions about outcome probabilities. The first uses the
probability that a U.S. patent is found valid during litigation, as re-
ported by Allison and Lemley (2002). The second uses the observed
opposition outcome probabilities for the EPO system, and the third
uses the observed re-examination outcome probabilities of the USPTO
system, both given in table 4.2. The latter choice is very conservative,
and an opposition system is unlikely to lead to patent revocation prob-
abilities as low as 11 percent. For each of these three outcome scenarios,
we report five computations, three using a (comparatively) low opposi-
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by Levin and Levin (2002). We also experiment with assuming a social
cost for rejection and an avoided cost for patent amendment as well
as for patent revocation.
Almost all the scenarios yield cost-benefit ratios well in excess of
unity, with the exception of some of those that use the re-examination
outcome probabilities. The lowest ratios for each panel are for the high
opposition cost cases. We conclude that unless the opposition system
is very expensive to operate and yields results similar to those now
obtained with the re-examination system, it would be likely to generate
substantial welfare gains.
VI.Conclusions and Additional Questions
The determinants and characteristics of patent challenge procedures
are important issues in any assessment of intellectual property systems
of the United States or other industrial economies. In a knowledge-
based economy, intellectual property systems are constantly chal-
lenged by the advance of technology, a process that, among other
things, creates new artifacts to which the necessarily backward-looking
patent system must respond. A knowledge-based economy also is one
in which the high political salience of national and global intellectual
property systems means that they are the focus of political lobbying
to strengthen, adapt, or weaken specific features of intellectual prop-
erty regulation, administration, and law to favor particular interests.
Both these forces have been at work within the U.S. intellectual prop-
erty system during the past quarter-century; a period of significant
strengthening of patent holder rights has triggered a debate over the
appropriate level and limits of such rights. This debate has important
transatlantic and global repercussions and analogues.
As the knowledge-based economy has evolved in the United States
and elsewhere, it has become clear that such evolution brings with it
increasing attention to the ownership of knowledge in the form of intel-
lectual property by firms and governments. Together with the increas-
ing importance of software in all areas, which in itself is an impetus to
the growth of the knowledge-based economy, we have an expansion
of the subject matter base that must be considered by patent offices
everywhere. Such expansion is not a new phenomenon. It has tended
to happen whenever important changes take place in technological
regimes, but it does lead to two kinds of adjustment problems: first,
debates over the validity of the subject matter extension, such as thoseImproving U.S. Patent Quality 139
that have occurred between the United States and Europe over busi-
ness method patents, and second, a concern that overly broad and in-
valid patents may issue early in the development of the technology
because of the lack of prior art in the relevant patent office databases,
even though such prior art may exist among those who practice the
technology. The second problem, which may be defined broadly as
the difficulty of determining the validity of a patent applicatioii in
new and less well understood technologies, is the one that an inter par-
tes postgrant review or re-examination system might be designed to
address.
To understand how such a system might work, the analysis in this
paper highlights several interesting features of the patent challenge sys-
tems of the U.S. and EPO systems. First, the current U.S. re-examination
procedure differs dramatically from the EPO opposition procedure in
almost all its features, of which the most significant are the identity of
the party requesting a re-examination (the patent owner in more than
40 percent of the cases) and the outcomes (which rarely include rev-
ocation of the patent). These characteristics of re-examination hardly
qualify it as the sort of adversarial procedure that EPO oppositions
represent, but they are not surprising when we consider the differences
in structure between the two procedures: (1) a three-examiner panel
including the original examiner, but not as chair, in the EPO versus a
single examiner, often the same as the original examiner, in the USPTO;
(2) the prohibition in later litigation of questions that could have been
raised in a re-examination in the United States; and (3) the inter partes
nature of the proceeding at the EPO versus the ex parte nature of the
proceeding at the USPTO.
Keeping in mind the significant differences between the re-examina-
tion and opposition processes, our comparative analysis suggests that
EPO oppositions are not significantly swifter in resolving challenges
than the USPTO re-examination proceedings, as might be expected
given their more adversarial nature. Indeed, opposition proceedings
in some cases (and almost certainly in important, complex cases with
numerous opponents, appeals, etc.) may well take as much time to be
resolved as does litigation in the U.S. system. Nonetheless, the higher
frequency of opposition (which is presumably due to the lower cost
associated with opposition compared to the cost of litigation in the
United States) within the EPO system suggests that this process han-
dles many more legal disputes over patent validity than are addressed
by the U.S. re-examination process.140 Hall, Graham, Harhoff, and Mowery
Our analysis also indicates that patent amendment, rather than revo-
cation, is more likely for oppositions in relatively new fields of inven-
tive activity, for more complex patents, or for oppositions in which
numerous opponents participate. We lack evidence on the extent to
which oppositions are followed by litigation in the European patent
system, so we cannot determine whether the lack of any advantage for
oppositions in resolving patent disputes quickly is offset by a reduction
of litigation rates associated with oppositions. The EPO system may
offer few advantages over the U.S. system for postissue patent chal-
lenges, but we cannot address this issue without analyzing litigation
data for both the U.S. and European systems. Any comprehensive as-
sessment of the social costs and benefits of the two challenge systems
requires a consideration of both the patent office processes of postgrant
challenge (opposition or re-examination) and legal system litigation.
Nevertheless, the preliminary computations presented here suggest
that the social gains from such a system might be substantial.
Notes
We appreciate the extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft by the editors of this
journal, Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner.
See Lunney (2001) for an argument that the nonobviousness test has been weakened
since the creation of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in 1982.
Presumably, if the invention has already been reduced to practice by others, the poten-
tial gain from incenting an inventor is zero, so we are left only with the deadweight loss
from monopoly.
This decision presumably made it more difficult to reject patents such as U.S. 6368227,
the patent on a swinging method that uses a technique known by children for decades
but not placed on the record. Note that this particular patent has been subject to a re-
examination request by the U.S. patent commissioner because of the publicity it received.
The problem with patents like this one is not necessarily that they are enforceable in the
courts but that they clog the system and raise its total cost.
As quoted in the Los Angeles Times, February 7, 2003.
Our evidence (Graham et al. 2003) suggests that the average reexamination takes less
than two years, slightly shorter than the average duration of a patent lawsuit (thirty-
one months), but this difference is not large (especially in view of the high variance
of the "average duration" estimate for a trial). Some observers have criticized the re-
examination system for not providing a fast and cheap alternative to trial.
An alternative re-examination procedure, the inter partes re-examination, was enacted
by the U.S. Congress in 1999 (see the American Inventors Protection Act, codified
in 35 USC 311-318. Several commentators have questioned the efficacy of the inter partes
re-examination on the grounds that it allows the third-party requestor limited opportuni-Improving U.S. Patent Quality 141
ties of involvement; prevents any adverse findings of the USPTO from being appealed
to the courts; and also precludes the raising of any questions of validity on grounds
that were, or may have been, raised during the inter partes re-examination from being
litigated in the courts (Neifeld 2000). The USPTO reports no inter partes re-examination
requests in 2000 and one in 2001, suggesting that the procedure has been little used.
Kaufman Company o. Lantech, Inc., 807 F.2d 970 (CAFC 1986), suggesting that eviden-
tiary burdens are likely higher for challengers after re-examination.
This owner initiation occurs in many cases in which declaratory validity determinations
are being sought by a challenger third party. These suits, which make the patentee the
defendant, are often initiated only after a demand by the patent holder that the challenger
stop infringing on the patent, thus putting the initial move in the hands of the patent holder.
The Convention on the Grant of European Patents, also referred to here as the Euro-
pean Patent Convention (EPC) was enacted in October 1973. It is the legal foundation
for the establishment of the EPO. The full text of the convention is available at hap:!!
www3.european-patent-office.org/dwld/epc/epc_2000.pdf.
At the time of writing, the exchange rate was approximately 0.93 euros per dollar.
As in other patent systems, the official patent office fees are a relatively small part
of the costs (in this case, 4,300. Professional representation before the EPO amounts to
5,500 on average, whereas translation into the languages of eight contracting states
requires 11,500. Renewal fees for a patent maintained for ten years amount to roughly
8,500. See "Cost of an average European patent as of 1.7.99," http://www.european-
patent-office.org/epo/new/kosten_e.pdf (accessed January 14, 2002).
Using data from court filings in Mannheim and Duesseldorf, Cremers (2003) identi-
fies 715 patent infringement cases involving 905 patents during the 1993-1995 period.
These courts account for about 55 to 60 percent of all cases filed in Germany. The three-
year average of EPO patents issued since 1980, which included Germany as one of the
covered regions, is about 71,000. This figure is for a litigation probability of about 2.1
percent (assuming that the process is stationary).
The latter statement is premised on the argument that more oppositions than suits
are filed partly because they are lower cost.
In fact, according to data reported by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2002), it is the
other way around in the United States: small firms and independent inventors are far
more likely to ifie infringement suits than are larger firms.
This is the reason why the European Patent Office is entitled to pursue opposition
cases, even if the two parties wish to settle the case. Thus, this feature of an opposition
system can be expected to increase social welfare.
With linear demand, the welfare loss from monopoly wifi be one-half the monopoly
rents.
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